TECHNICAL NOTICE / 28 OCTOBER 2026

Privacy and data boundaries

The public research desk is static. Its first-party scripts contain no analytics, advertising or cookie-storage code. Selecting a language changes the URL; questions and local feedback drafts are processed in your browser and are not submitted to a research queue.

Loading pages still sends ordinary connection information, including your IP address and requested path, to hosting and network providers. We do not claim that transport data never exists. A verified connection-log retention schedule has not been published.

Free API — open

The live service at api.exit-protocol.io uses pseudonymous bearer access and structured supported-subject queries. It asks for no name, email, wallet or payment. Optional answer copies expire after 24 hours; request detail and feedback are pruned after 7 days when maintenance runs. Hashed identifiers and quota/replay counters persist for campaign and recovery controls. A research record keeps its route, subject and scope for at most 7 days; a watch keeps up to 128 recorded changes from the last 7 days and ends within 7 days; stopping it deletes them. Automatic alerts are a limited pilot: a receiver's HTTPS address and signing secret are kept while its watch is active, alert events, delivery attempts and provider reads for at most 7 days, raw provider replies for at most one day; revoking a key removes them. These are deployed implementation limits, not a guarantee of deletion from every operational backup.

The campaign runs from 25 October to 24 November 2026, 12:38:20 UTC. Structured feedback is optional. Usage, quotas, cache expiry and access revocation are described in the API guide. The public evidence log at exit-protocol.io/log/ holds records EXIT publishes about public chain data and is anchored on Solana once a day. Where a watch change or an answer is bound to the log, its record and random salt go only to the account that received it; the log publishes only a salted hash and its known_at time, the notary job keeps no copy after appending, and a private submission that waits longer than 7 days is not admitted. Do not send private information or secrets in public issue reports. This notice does not claim legal compliance or a verified private contact channel.

Enrollment abuse prevention — 26 October 2026

To protect free access capacity, new access-key registrations are limited to two per network per UTC day. IPv4 addresses and IPv6 /64 network prefixes are grouped for this purpose; people sharing a network share this registration limit. Existing working keys remain usable under their normal quotas.

The counter stores a daily keyed digest of the connecting network address, not the raw address. These are pseudonymous security data, not anonymous data or proof of a person’s identity. Only the current and preceding UTC-day counters are kept by the active service. Older counters are purged on the next request or periodic maintenance pass, normally within 60 seconds. Deletion cannot run while the service is stopped, and this schedule does not guarantee deletion from operational backups. No email, wallet or external challenge provider is added by this control. Using multiple independent networks can still bypass a network limit.

Enrollment proof of work — 26 October 2026

New key registration performs a small, bounded SHA-256 proof of work in your browser. A signed challenge is bound to the connecting network, expires after ten minutes, and can create at most one access key. Used challenge digests expire on the next maintenance pass after challenge expiry; operational backups may retain them. No external challenge provider, email or wallet is required. This is abuse resistance, not proof that a visitor is a unique person. Network registration limits still apply; campaign and daily capacity are shown before registration.